There’s precedent(presəˌdənt) for Amazon(-zən,ˈaməˌzän) competing(kəmˈpēt) with so many companies. It doesn’t end well.

There’s precedent(presəˌdənt) for Amazon(-zən,ˈaməˌzän) competing(kəmˈpēt) with so many companies. It doesn’t end well.

By Michael J. Coren

Perhaps no other company in history has sold so many different products (354 million) while competing against so many other companies (hundreds). In the past, that power hasn’t lasted. Amazon is betting(ˈbetiNG) it will be different.

Amazon today is a retailer(ˈrēˌtāl), a logistics(lō-,ləˈjistiks) network, a book publisher, a movie studio(ˈst(y)o͞odēˌō), a fashion(ˈfaSHən) designer(dəˈzīnər), a hardware maker, a cloud services provider, and far, far more. The private(ˈprīvit) equity(ˈekwitē) firm(fərm) Pitchbook(piCH) estimates(e) the company Jeff Bezos founded in 1994 competes head-to-head with at least 129 major(ˈmājər) corporations(ˌkôrpəˈrāSHən) just in major markets. That number grows higher as it adds new business units(ˈyo͞onit) such as fashion, food, and analytics(ˌanlˈitiks).

The company so far has escaped(iˈskāp) serious(ˈsi(ə)rēəs) antitrust(ˌantēˈtrəst,ˌantī-) scrutiny(ˈskro͞otn-ē) by US regulators(ˈregyəˌlātər) in part because it can point to so many commercial(kəˈmərSHəl) adversaries(ˈadvərˌserē) with a piece(pēs) of the market. Even in its primary(ˈprīm(ə)rē,ˈprīˌmerē) business—e-commerce(ˈkämərs)—Amazon only took in 23% of the $395 billion Americans spent online last year, and far less when that spending is broken down into individual(ˌindəˈvijəwəl) markets. The one exception is books, where it controls about 65% of the e-book market.

But Amazon’s unprecedented(ˌənˈpresəˌdəntid) logistics and delivery(diˈlivərē) infrastructure(ˈinfrəˌstrəkCHər), paired with access to personal data about Americans’ purchasing(ˈpərCHəs) habits(ˈhabit), means it is unique(yo͞oˈnēk) in the history of global commerce. No company has ever wielded(wēld) this combination(ˌkämbəˈnāSHən) of consumer insight(ˈinˌsīt) and infrastructure, say historians(hiˈstôrēən) and legal(ˈlēgəl) analysts(ˈanl-ist), which means the company grows stronger and less assailable(əˈsāləbəl) with every purchase.

The seed(sēd) of Bezos’s vision(ˈviZHən) of a store that could sell everything was planted long ago. Bezos told shareholders(ˈSHe(ə)rˌhōldər) (pdf) in 1998 that Amazon “may make decisions and weigh(wā) tradeoff(trād) differently than some companies…At this stage, we choose to prioritize(prīˈôrəˌtīz,ˈprīərə-) growth because we believe that scale(skāl) is central(ˈsentrəl) to achieving(əˈCHēv) the potential(pəˈtenCHəl) of our business model.” Not much has changed. This year’s $13.7 billion Whole(hōl) Foods acquisition(ˌakwəˈziSHən), and Bezos’s personal purchase of The Washington(ˈwäSH-,ˈwôSHiNGtən) Post in 2016, are merely(ˈmi(ə)rlē) stepping stones in Bezos’ globe(glōb)-spanning(span) ambitions(amˈbiSHən).

Regulators are starting to size up whether Amazon is on the verge(vərj) of becoming a monopoly(məˈnäpəlē). Amazon may find it doesn’t like the answer.